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Abstract 
 
We study the effects of ideological polarization on regional planning networks. Over the last 
several decades, Americans have sorted themselves into local communities that are increasingly 
homogenous in their partisan and ideological make-up (Bishop 2008). Local governments from 
these communities face immense pressures to engage in regional planning; however, we 
hypothesize that differences in the political composition of local constituencies will render such 
intergovernmental cooperation difficult. Using data from a recent survey of California planners 
and government officials, we map regional planning networks in five California regions in real 
geographic space and test hypotheses about the factors that lead local governments to engage in 
regional planning activities. We find that, after controlling for physical distance and similarity of 
planning preferences, local governments whose constituents are similar politically are more 
likely to cooperate with one another in regional planning efforts than those whose constituents 
hold disparate political views. 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 2010 Duke Networks Conference.  Note: Citations are 
incomplete.
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Introduction 
This paper tests the hypothesis that politically-similar local governments are more likely 
to collaborate in the context of regional land-use and transportation planning in California.  We 
expect the political logic of collective action to influence the structure of local planning 
networks, even controlling for other factors expected to affect the costs and benefits of 
collaboration, such as geographical proximity and similarity in planning preferences and contexts 
(Feiock 2007, 2009). To better understand the political logic of local collaboration, our analysis 
links the "institutional collective action"(ICA) approach to ideas about ideological sorting and 
polarization into different types of communities.   
ICA focuses on how regional institutions influence the benefits and transaction costs of 
solving interjurisdicational collective action problems.   ICA provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding why researchers and observers from across the political spectrum have increased 
their calls for regional approaches to land use planning and policy-making (Friedmann, 1980; 
Benjamin, 2001; Norris, 2001).  Regional collective-action problems occur when local 
governments with land-use authority ignore the positive or negative consequences of their 
decisions that spill over jurisdictional boundaries.  The spatial mismatch between the costs and 
benefits of land-use decisions and the boundaries of political jurisdictions creates planning 
inefficiencies (at best) and serious externalities caused by uncoordinated land use practices (at 
worst), and has led to increasing calls for regional planning – voluntary efforts by individual 
local governments to coordinate with others in the region to achieve improved planning 
outcomes.  
Coordinated planning at a regional level can allow regions to make more efficient and 
effective decisions about: where to locate new development; what kinds of development to allow 
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and/or encourage; how to invest in regional public infrastructure such as transportation networks, 
public facilities, parks and open space; and how to share the costs and benefits of development 
across the region. Academic researchers purport to demonstrate the economic and environmental 
benefits of coordinated regional planning. And numerous national, state and local planning 
associations offer regional planning guidelines and resources to professional planners and local 
officials.  
 ICA argues regional cooperation will evolve when the benefits of collective action 
outweigh the transaction costs of searching for mutually beneficial solutions, bargaining over 
different policies, and monitoring and enforcing any resulting agreements (Maser 1998; Feiock 
2009).  This benefit/cost ratio is affected by important variables considered in the planning 
literature. For example, the benefits of collaboration are higher for geographically nearby 
jurisdictions because they have more interdependence and have opportunities for repeated 
interaction.   Collaboration may also be higher among jurisdictions with similar economic and 
social circumstances, because similar preferences reduce the costs of bargaining over collective 
goods, and increase the benefits of learning.  Regional planning efforts are generally 
hypothesized to decrease the overall transaction costs cooperation by providing financial, 
technical, and personnel resources.   
But the existing literature has placed less emphasis on the political calculus of regional 
planning, which creates an interesting set of problems.  Regional planning requires political 
actors – mayors, city councils, county boards, and administrative staff – to cede some of their 
local authority over land use decisions to neighboring jurisdictions and organizations. These 
political actors may then be held accountable by their local constituents for land use decisions 
over which they have little control.  Local political actors also pay attention to the broader 
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political context by making decisions that are consistent with the policy preferences of governors 
and state legislators—political actors that operate on partisan considerations.  Political science 
research has demonstrated that variations in political costs and benefits within individual 
jurisdictions help explain the extent to which political actors are willing to engage in regional 
policy and planning activities (Feiock and Kim 2000; Gerber and Gibson 2009; Lubell, Feiock 
and Ramirez 2005, 2009). However, little research to date seeks to describe or understand how 
these types of political costs and benefits influence interjurisdicational relationships.   
We integrate the political logic of regional collaboration into the ICA framework by 
examining how the ideological polarization of a region’s residents into politically distinct 
communities affects how political decision-makers perceive the benefits and costs of regional 
collaboration.  Over the last 30 years, increasingly mobile Americans have been sorting 
themselves into communities with more and more like-minded neighbors (Bishop 2008). A 
consequence of this ideological sorting has been an increase in ideological polarization across 
many metro areas, with liberal people living in liberal communities (typically within the central 
city), conservative people living in conservative communities (typically around the suburban 
periphery), and reduced ideological diversity within communities. From a political perspective, 
this ideological polarization can make cooperation more difficult. Liberals and conservatives 
may have very different ideas about what is best for their region, reducing the perceived benefits 
of cooperation. And constituents may oppose cooperation with others “not like them,” increasing 
the perceived political costs to cooperation for local government officials. Partisan politics at 
higher levels of government that are tied to regional decisions further increase the transaction 
costs of cooperation.   
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We examine the impact of political similarity on collaboration using data from a unique 
survey of local government officials in five California metro areas, where we characterize the 
regional planning networks in each region. We then use GIS to construct measures of ideological 
distance in each metro area’s local jurisdictions (based on Census data and voter registration 
records) and link those population patterns to each area’s regional planning network. We 
hypothesize that ideological distance will decrease the probability of network links between local 
government jurisdictions.  If political calculations are important, the negative influence of 
ideological distance will influence network structure, controlling for other prominent 
explanations, especially the increased interdependence due to physical proximity and 
“homophily” where cities of similar size and socio-economic composition share common 
planning preferences.  In terms of the overall network, we hypothesize that metropolitan areas 
with higher levels of polarization across their local governments will have planning networks 
that are less dense and more fragmented into ideologically similar clusters than regions that are 
more ideologically homogenous. These hypotheses are tested using logistic regression, 
descriptive network statistics, exponential random graph models, and Newman-Girvan clustering 
algorithms.1   
Ideological Polarization in US Metro Areas 
 Numerous modern political scientists have contemplated the existence, causes and 
consequences of ideological polarization in the U.S. Something like a consensus has emerged 
that, at the elite level, actors within both parties have become more extreme, moderates have 
become more rare, and the nation’s politics and policies in many ways reflect this elite 
polarization (McCarty et al. 200x; Brady and Nivola 200x). Less agreement exists over the 
                                                 
1 We don't implement all of these techniques in this paper; some of the analysis is still underway. 
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causes of this elite polarization, with various studies pointing towards redistricting and 
reapportionment, leadership styles, and other factors.  
At the mass level, the data are less clear. Some studies conclude that individuals have 
followed (or perhaps driven) the observed changes amongst elites and have also become more 
polarized , while others argue that – in the aggregate – the distribution of ideology has remained 
relatively stable.  
Whether individuals have changed or not, it is clear that the distribution of people across 
the political landscape has changed. Numerous historians and demographers document the 
massive exodus of middle class whites, beginning in the 1960s, out of the industrial cities of the 
Northeast and Midwest. These migrants created rings of sprawling suburbs around central cities, 
established new communities in the exurban countryside, and populated whole new sections of 
the country in the South and Southwest. Fueled by affluence, transportation options and 
employment opportunities, this increasing mobility has freed people to act on their preferences 
for social homogeneity and move into communities with like-minded people. Bishop (2009) 
illustrates the striking result: more and more communities with a large majority of 
Republican/conservative residents or a large majority of Democratic/liberal residents, and fewer 
and fewer communities with genuine partisan and ideological diversity.2  
The Effects of Polarization and Ideological "Distance" on Regional Planning 
 What are the effects of ideological polarization on regional planning efforts? To answer 
this question, we need a theory of local decision-making as it relates to coordination and 
                                                 
2 Bishop’s study takes counties as the unit of analysis and shows the increasing polarization of 
U.S. counties as measured by presidential vote returns. For some purposes, counties are probably 
a relevant unit of analysis, and presidential voting is probably a relevant measure of ideological 
polarization. For other purposes, such as the current focus on regional planning, it is important to 
consider polarization at other levels of aggregation, such as cities.  
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cooperation in the land use planning sphere. We lay out the main elements of such a theory, and 
the hypotheses that follow from it, below. In general, our political theory links to the ICA 
approach by arguing that ideological polarization increases the transaction costs of regional 
cooperation. 
 Decisions about whether and with whom to cooperate on regional planning are made by 
local government officials – elected and appointed – in whom planning authority is vested. States 
vary in terms of how this authority is organized, as do local jurisdictions within states, though the 
typical arrangement requires appointed planning commissions and planning staff to develop 
general plans and policies, and elected officials (city councils or county boards) to approve 
general plans and zoning ordinances for implementation. In other words, both appointed/ 
administrative and elected/ political officials must agree to any major changes in a community’s 
land use policy, including whether to engage in regional planning efforts. In this sense, we can 
think of elected officials has wielding veto power over land use decision-making in their 
jurisdictions. This is the case in California, which is the state from which the data for the current 
study is drawn.  
Elected and appointed officials are likely to have different preferences over whether and 
with whom to cooperate, due at least in part to their different career incentives. Appointed 
officials, such as planning staff and city/county managers, are policy professionals, trained in 
planning schools and public policy/public administration programs, whose prospects for career 
advancement derive largely from the validation of their peers and the standards of their 
professional associations. In the context of approaches to regional planning, this translates into a 
preference for efficiency and effectiveness in planning processes and outcomes, and sensitivity 
to current ideas about “good planning practices” (such as regional planning). Elected officials, by 
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contrast, are political actors whose ability to retain their office requires them to comply – at least 
on some level – with the wishes of the local citizens and stakeholders who will support them in 
the next election. For these decision-makers, complying with local preferences may mean 
supporting regional cooperation if citizens believe such cooperation is beneficial to their 
community, or opposing regional cooperation if citizens believe their community’s interests are 
in conflict with those of the larger region. Importantly, if local citizens oppose cooperation on 
land use issues, then even if there are good economic and policy reasons to cooperate, local 
elected officials may perceive that the political costs are too high and therefore oppose such a 
policy.3 We therefore focus primarily on costs and benefits as perceived by these political actors. 
 Local government officials must make two distinct but interrelated decisions: whether or 
not to cooperate, and with who. Unlike many collaborative endeavors, the scope of regional land 
use planning is rarely fixed or predetermined; rather, participants voluntarily self-select into a 
cooperative arrangement and that selection process defines the “region” and determines the 
nature, size and scope of the cooperative effort.4 Some regional land use planning efforts are 
small in scale and are limited to two or three local units. Others are large, encompassing entire 
metropolitan areas or more. A primary goal of this study is to better understand how local 
decision-making produces regional planning efforts of different size and scope.  
                                                 
3 Of course, city government staff and commissions are ultimately dependent on political 
officials (city councils and county boards) for their jobs, and so on some level, we should not 
expect the preferences of appointed and elected officials from the same city to diverge 
substantially. However, as with any principle-agent relationship, appointed officials (the agents) 
may have some discretion to diverge from the wishes of elected officials (the principles) due to 
their informational and expertise advantages. As the salience and contentiousness of planning 
issues increases in a jurisdiction, we expect this divergence to become smaller.   
s 
4 Some regional land use planning efforts take place within pre-existing regional institutions such 
as metropolitan planning organizations, regional councils, councils of governments, etc. In those 
instances, the set of participants and geographic scope is pre-determined.  
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In general, the ICA approach expects local elected officials to perceive the benefits of 
cooperation to be higher, and the costs lower, when the other jurisdiction(s) are more similar on a 
number of dimensions.  This argument is captured by the concept of ideological distance: two 
cities whose constituents hold very similar political views (e.g., both have a strong majority of 
liberal Democrats) are said to be ideologically proximate, while those whose constituents hold 
very different political views (e.g., one has a strong majority of liberal Democrats and one has a 
strong majority of conservative Republicans) are said to be ideologically distant. We expect 
ideological distance to reduce the benefits and increase the transaction costs of regional planning. 
On the benefits side, we expect local jurisdictions whose citizens are very different ideologically 
to have different ideas about the appropriate role of government, in planning as well as other 
areas. Cities with liberal populations tend to prefer a more expansive role for government while 
cities with conservative populations tend to prefer a more limited role. Two cities that are 
ideologically distant, one with a very liberal population and one with a very conservative 
population, may find little common ground and therefore few benefits to cooperation.  
On the costs side, we expect constituents to more strongly oppose efforts to cooperate 
with cities whose residents are very different from their own. Residents may distrust the 
governments of cities with populations who want very different things, and may threaten to 
withhold electoral support from city officials who engage and cooperate with disparate cities, 
independent of any actual planning outcomes that may result from their interaction. Anticipating 
these potential political costs, local decision-makers may prefer to act independently, rather than 
risk being punished electorally by their constituents for cooperation. We therefore hypothesize 
that ideological distance will reduce the probability that two cities cooperate in a regional 
planning network.  
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The Effects of Socioeconomic and Physical Distance on Regional Planning 
 Testing the effects of ideological distance requires controlling for other characteristics of 
cities that may influence the benefits and transaction costs of cooperation.  Two classes of 
attributes traditionally considered by ICA and the planning literature are socioeconomic distance 
and physical distance.   
As with ideological distance, we expect socio-economic distance to reduce the benefits 
and increase the costs of regional planning as well. Two (or more) cities with very different 
populations may find little common ground for regional planning. Higher SES populations may 
prefer certain types of land use patterns and practices – limiting growth, maintaining low density 
requirements, preserving land for recreation and open space – that are very different from those 
preferred by poor populations – increasing densities, supplying affordable housing, etc. Officials 
from cities whose citizens have such different land use preferences may find it difficult to 
identify common regional approaches that satisfy both sets of constituents. By contrast, officials 
whose citizens have similar land use preferences may find it easier to agree to common land use 
policies, increasing the benefits of cooperation. Socio-economic distance also reduces the costs 
of cooperation. Just as citizens may oppose efforts to cooperate with cities whose residents are 
very different politically, they may also oppose cooperation with places that are very different 
from their own in terms of racial/ethnic and economic composition. We therefore hypothesize 
that socio-economic distance will reduce the probability that two cities will cooperate in a 
regional planning network. 
We expect physical distance to reduce (i.e., geographic proximity to increase) the 
benefits and increase the costs of regional planning. Two (or more) cities that are located 
physically close to one another often share common geographic features that pose common 
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challenges or opportunities for development; decision-makers can learn and model behavior 
from similarly-situated peers and engage in repeated interaction. Decision-makers in neighboring 
cities may find that shorter distances make it easier to meet, discuss common issues and interests, 
and generally facilitate cooperation. In addition, land use decisions in one community will often 
have geographic spillovers into neighboring cities, especially those that share common borders. 
Jointly planning for and regulating growth and development in closely located cities will allow 
parties on both sides to better manage and internalize these spillovers. We therefore hypothesize 
that physical distance will reduce (i.e., physical proximity will increase) the probability that two 
cities cooperate in a regional planning network. 
Research Design: Regional Planning in California 
To test our hypotheses, we utilize an internet/telephone survey of land-use and 
transportation stakeholders in five study regions in California conducted from March to 
November 2006.5  Each of the regions featured a regional collaborative process of some type 
(see Table 1) that was designed to encourage collaboration among local governments and other 
stakeholders.  The survey population consisted of participants in the respective collaborative 
process, all stakeholders in the region identified as participants in Environmental Impact 
Statements in the California Environmental Quality Act database, and all planning staff/elected 
officials from city and county governments within the region.  The sample frame sought to 
encompass the broad range of policy actors associated with land-use and transportation planning 
activities throughout the region, including but not limited to the specific collaborative process.  
                                                 
5 The research occurred in three phases.  The first phase (3/06-5/06) collected data in Merced and Tri-County. The 
second phase (9/06-11/06) collected data for SACOG, San Diego, and Riverside.  The respondents were first 
contacted by email, and then non-respondents were contacted via telephone. Some of the non-respondents opted to 
complete the survey on the internet, while others completed a telephone interview.  
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There was a total of 752 respondents, with response rates of 46% (127) respondents for Merced, 
41% (111 respondents) for Tri-County, 25% (116 respondents) for Riverside, 42% (291 
respondents) for Sacramento, and 30% (107 respondents) for San Diego.6  
[Table 1 about here] 
This paper focuses exclusively on the survey responses from city and county respondents, 
including both elected and appointed officials, and administrative staff.  In the next version of 
the paper, we will provide more details on the response rates among the local governments.    
Constructing Local Government Planning Networks 
To identify collaboration networks, we asked each survey respondent to "identify 
organizations/stakeholders that you have collaborated with in the past three years regarding 
regional land-use issues."  The respondent was then presented with a roster of 53 possible 
organizations, including city and county elected/appointed officials and administrative staff.  If 
they indicated collaborating with local government officials, they were then prompted to write in 
the name of that local government.  Note that the survey question does not focus specifically on 
the regional planning process in place, but rather more generally on land-use and transportation 
planning issues.  Hence the resulting collaboration networks span a broad range of policy 
activities. 
Constructing the collaboration network requires a reasonable definition of network 
boundaries.  Limiting the network boundaries to the specific cities covered by each regional 
process is insufficient because many local government respondents nominated governments 
                                                 
6 The lower response rates in Riverside and San Diego can be attributed to the 2003 completion of the planning 
effort in Riverside, and the fairly narrow focus on the North County area of San Diego.  One of the future challenges 
of research using the EG framework will be to construct surveys that remain relevant to respondents, who are 
normally more motivated when the survey focuses on a narrow, identifiable, and ongoing policy process. 
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outside of their regions as collaborative partners.  For example, one of our sample regions is 
Merced county and thus Merced county and any cities within it are automatically included in the 
regional network.  However, respondents from the Merced regional network also named cities 
outside of Merced County, and local governments outside of Merced named cities within Merced 
as collaborative partnerships.   
Hence, our network boundaries are empirically defined by allowing cities outside a 
particular region to "opt-in" into a regional network by nominating a city in the region as a 
network partner.  Cities outside the region could also be "selected-in" the regional network if a 
respondent from a city within the region nominated a city outside the region as a network 
partner. Hence the network boundaries have a strong regional basis as defined endogenously by 
the study respondents themselves.  But the network boundaries do not include every single 
jurisdiction in California, because that would artificially increase the size of the potential 
network partners considered by a particular local government.  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
The resultant regional networks are geographically displayed in Figure 1 for the whole 
state and Figure 2 specifically for Sacramento.  The network ties are drawn between the 
centroids of the geographic boundaries of each jurisdiction.  The greater density of connections 
within region shows how the networks are regionally focused, which is to be expected given our 
study design. But the networks also exhibit a reasonable number of cross-regional connections, 
mostly to neighboring regions, but with a few long-distance connections.  For example, 
Sacramento region jurisdictions have three collaborative ties with Riverside County.  Visual 
inspection of the networks suggests that most of these long distance connections involve 
counties, although we have not yet quantified this claim.  But given the importance of counties at 
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broader statewide decision-making, it is reasonable to expect counties to have more opportunities 
to make long distance connections. 
Constructing "Distance" Variables 
Given our definition of regional communities and the incidence of collaborative 
relationships among them, the main task is to analyze the structure of each regional network and 
understand the variables that predict connections.  The most important theoretical variable for 
this paper is ideological distance, but we also want to test for the importance of the other 
variables considered by the ICA framework, namely physical distance and socioeconomic 
distance. Table 2 below summarizes how we constructed each of our independent variables.  To 
clarify, it should be remembered that every potential network connection in a particular region 
compasses a dyadic unit of analysis, which allows for the construction of distance variables.  
[Table 2 about here] 
To construct the ideological distance variable, we calculated the six-dimensional 
Euclidian distance between jurisdictions p and q on the basis of 2008 voter registration for six 
political parties:  % Republican, % Democrat, % Green, % American Independent, % 
Libretarian, % Peace and Freedom.  The formula for Euclidian distance between two points p 
and q on n dimensions is ඥ∑ ሺ݌௜ െ ݍ௜ሻଶ௡௜ୀଵ .   
The socio-demographic distance variables are calculated by taking the absolute value of 
the difference between the two local jurisdictions; higher values thus mean a greater difference 
between local governments and zero means no difference. These absolute value differences are 
equivalent to Euclidean distance in one dimension.   Distance population and distance 
population change were transformed to deal with data storage limitations in the SIENA software 
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used in the ERGM analysis.  Physical distance is calculated using GIS as the distance in miles 
between the centroids of the relevant local government jurisdictions.   
Dyadic Logit Analysis of Collaborative Ties 
 The first cut at the analysis is a dyadic logit analysis similar to those used in many 
international relations studies, where all of the potential dyads in the five regional networks are 
the units of analysis, and the dependent variable equals one if there is a collaborative tie and zero 
otherwise.  Although the logit analysis doesn't capture the full interdependency among the 
regional network, it does give some initial insights. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Table 3 shows the results of the analysis. The first column contains the full model, and 
the second column drops two variables (percent non-white, percent urban population) that are 
highly multi-collinear with other variables in the model.  All of the variables in the model are 
statistically significant, with the exception of percent population change.  As might be expected, 
the largest driver of collaborative ties is physical distance, which has a strong influence on levels 
of interdependence, opportunities for repeated interactions, and reduced costs of interaction (i.e.;, 
it just takes less time to drive next door!).  Local government jurisdictions with similar income 
distributions and levels of urbanization are also more likely to collaborate. The only surprising 
finding is that cities with similar population sizes are less likely to collaborate.  We speculate 
that this reflects an urban-rural phenomena that might be unique in the Central Valley of 
California, where in each region we study there is a fairly large urban city surrounded by smaller, 
more rural cities and located in mostly rural counties.  The collaborative land-use institutions are 
designed to foster regional collaboration, which at least partly focuses on encouraging the urban 
areas to cooperate more with rural partners.   
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 Most importantly for this paper, ideological distance reduces the probability of 
collaboration even controlling for the other variables.  Taken together, the models predict 
collaborative ties very well, with McKelvey and Zavonia R2 greater than .70.  
Exponential Random Graph Analysis of Collaborative Ties 
 ERGM models relax the assumption of the logit models that each dyad is independent 
(Robins et al. 2007a).  Instead, ERGM assumes the likelihood of a link between any two local 
governments is conditional on the structural properties of the network in which a particular dyad 
is embedded.  ERGM models account for interdependency by defining a probability distribution 
for the set of all possible networks for a given set of nodes, which in our case are local 
governments.  The probability of any realized network is a function of structural properties of the 
network, dyadic variables (e.g.; distance), and attributes of individual nodes.  ERGM models 
then simulate thousands of networks and use maximum likelihood to find which parameters of 
the model create a distribution of networks that have the same average values of the observed 
network. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 Table 4 reports the results of three different ERGM models.  The full model contains all 
network structural effects, and also all the dyadic covariates including those with multi-
collinearity problems.  The model in the second column drops the percent non-white and urban 
population distance variables to avoid multi-collinearity problems.  The last model drops the 
network structural characteristics, and is closest in spirit to the logit models.  It gives some idea 
of what happens to the size of the coefficients when interdependence is not explicitly modeled.  
The ERGM direction and significance of the ERGM coefficients are interpreted analogously to 
the logit model.  The ERGM models have a good fit because the average count of network 
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structures in the simulated family of networks is not significantly different from the observed 
network (more here in next version of paper).   
 The ERGM results are generally consistent with the logit models.  Once percent non-
white is removed from the model, the ideological distance variable is negative and significant—
politically distant cities are less likely to collaborate.  The urbanization and income distance, and 
the physical distance variables, remain negative and significant.  The surprising finding about 
cities with different population sizes being more likely to cooperate is also replicated.   
 While the network structural characteristics are mainly included to appropriately account 
for interdependence, they also have some interesting substantive interpretations (Robins et al 
2007b).  Alternating k-stars and alternating k-triangles are "higher order" network statistics that 
take into account the tendency for a network to cluster around hubs (alternating k-stars) and 
exhibit transitivity and closure (alternating k-triangles).  The global properties of network with a 
positive alternating k-star parameter tends to have a core-periphery structure with a few very 
high degree nodes connected to many low degree nodes, a high variance in degree distribution, 
and decreasing marginal returns for higher levels of popularity.  A positive alternating k-triangle 
parameter leads to a "clumpy" network with subgroups of transitive triads forming multiple 
cores. 
 In practice, it is very common to have negative k-star parameters and positive k-triangle 
parameters, which represents to countervailing processes for structuring the network.  The 
negative k-star parameter suggests that popularity processes are moderated, and any clumping in 
the network is due to overlapping patterns of transitivity forming multiple cores.   The structure 
of our research design provides one explanation for this finding—our definition of "regional" 
networks is centered on five different regions and naturally creates multiple cores.  However, 
18 
 
Berardo and Scholz (2010) have forwarded the hypotheses that transitivity processes such as 
those captured by k-triangles suggest the presence of risky cooperation games, which is also the 
underlying assumption of the ICA perspective. 
Conclusion 
 This paper makes two contributions to the literature on local government collaboration 
and institutional collective-action.  First, we provide empirical evidence for some of the core 
hypotheses of the ICA regarding the benefits and transaction costs of local collaboration.  Local 
governments with similar socio-demographic characteristics in terms of urbanization, median 
income, and race are more likely to collaborate because they have similar policy preferences and 
thus face fewer transaction costs associated with bargaining over collective goods.  
Demographically similar local governments also have higher benefits of collaboration because 
they can learn from each other's policy experiments.  Contrary to the standard ICA hypotheses, 
local governments with different population sizes are more likely to collaborate, which possibly 
reflects the urban-rural nature of local communities in the California study regions. 
 Physical proximity also increases the likelihood of collaboration for reasons related to 
benefits and transaction costs.  Physically proximate jurisdictions have higher levels of 
interdependence and thus experience more opportunities for joint gains or avoiding joint costs. 
Physically proximate cities also engage in repeated interactions that make cooperation more 
likely, and reduce the logistical costs of interaction.   As with most other types of collaboration 
networks (e.g.; scientific collaboration), the network models confirm the importance of physical 
proximity.  
 The second and more important contribution is that we find evidence for a political logic 
of collective action that reduces the likelihood of collaboration between ideologically distant 
cities.  The increased ideological polarization of American communities makes local elected 
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officials and administrative staff accountable to the policy preferences of local political parties. 
The tendency of higher levels of government to dole out political benefits along party lines 
exacerbates this tendency.   The political benefits of collaboration are higher when reflecting 
these partisan preferences, and the network models suggest that ideological distance decreases 
the probability of forming network ties.   
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Table 1: Summary of Five Regional, Collaborative Land-Use and Transportation Processes in California  
Name Summary Authoritative Decisions 
Merced County Project 
for Integrated Planning 
Began in 2002 as a result of an interagency agreement between the Merced 
County Association of Governments and several state and federal agencies. 
Resulted in regional transportation impact fee 
assessment for new development.  Funding 
used for regional transportation projects 
consistent with regional plan. 
The Tri-County 
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
Began in 2005 when the California State Department of Transportation 
proposed that a collaborative transportation planning effort including land use 
considerations be undertaken by the Regional Transportation Planning 
Authorities  in Alpine, Calaveras, and Amador Counties. Built on several 
previous revenue sharing Memorandums of Understanding   
Revenue sharing MOUs identify regional 
priority projects for distribution of pooled state 
transportation funding.  
Sacramento Council of 
Governments (SACOG) 
Blueprint Process 
Began in 2000 when the Sacramento County Council of Governments 
instructed its staff to develop a land-use plan in conjunction with the update of 
the Metropolitan Transportation Plan required by the Federal Government. The 
collaborative nature of the process was in response to local government and 
environmental criticisms of previous planning efforts. 
Transportation plan manages spending of 
regional transportation funding.  Awards 
planning grants to cities and counties 
undertaking studies of development consistent 
with the regional Blueprint plan. 
Riverside County 
Integrated Project 
Began in 1998 with the drafting of a multi-stakeholder “vision statement” 
accompanying the update of the Riverside County General Plan.  The 
integrated project then evolved to encompass the county general plan, a habitat 
conservation plan, and a transportation plan.  These plans were completed in 
2003.  
Transportation plan manages spending of 
regional transportation funds; General Plan 
identifies desired land-uses throughout the 
county; Habitat Conservation Plan identifies 
conservation lands acquisitions and mitigation 
measures for protection of endangered species.   
San Diego Association of 
Governments North 
County Multiple Habitat 
Conservation Program 
Began in 1997 when San Diego County adopted a Multiple Species 
Conservation Program under the auspices of the Federal and State Endangered 
Species Acts.  The conservation planning efforts explicitly consider land-use 
and transportation issues associated with urban growth. Ongoing collaborative 
planning efforts are focused on the North County subregion.  
Habitat Conservation Program identifies 
conservation lands acquisitions and mitigation 
measures for protection of endangered species.  
Mitigation and monitoring is coordinated with 
expenditures on regional transportation 
projects.  
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Table 2:  Variable Construction and Sources 
Variable Computation Source 
Distance: voter 
registration Euclidean Distance 
California Secretary of State, 
Report of Registration, October 
20, 2008, "Registration by 
Political Subdivision by County" 
Distance: income 
($1000) 
|(median hh income in 1999 gov 1) - (median hh 
income in 1999 gov 2)| / 1000 
 
US Census 2000, SF3, Table 
P53 
Distance: percent non-
white 
 |(% non-white gov 1) - (% non-white gov 2)|/100 
 
US Census 2000, SF1, Table 
P3 
Square Root distance: 
percent pop. Change  |(% pop. change gov 1) - (% pop. change gov 2)|^1/2  
US Census 2000, SF1, Table 
P1 and US Census 1990, SF1, 
Table P1 
Distance: percent urban 
pop. 
 |(% urban pop gov 1) - (% urban pop gov 2)| * 100 
 
US Census 2000, SF1, Table 
P2 
Distance: percent urban 
housing 
 |(% urban housing gov 1) - (% urban housing gov 2)| 
* 100 
 
US Census 2000, SF1, Table 
H2 
Log distance: total 
population 
 log( |(total pop. gov 1) - (total pop. gov 2)| + 1) 
 
US Census 2000, SF1, Table 
P1 
Physical distance (10 
mile units) GIS calculated miles between centroids/10 
US Census Bureau, 
TIGER/Line Files 
Note:  Computations shown are for the ERGM models. For the logit model, the variables were not transformed into 
percentages and instead are in proportions.  Next version of the paper will make all variables equivalent. 
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Table 3:  Logit Model of Dyadic Collaboration Among Local Governments 
 Full Model 
Without Race and 
Population Change 
Ideological effects   
Distance: voter registration .07(.08)* .02(.02)* 
Socio-economic effects   
Distance: income ($1000) .97(.01)* .97 (.001)* 
Distance: percent non-white .08(.08)* NA 
Square root distance: percent population 
change .90 (.11) .91 (.11) 
Distance: percent urban population. .0004(.002)* NA 
Distance: percent urban housing 861.34 (3030.74)* .46 (.16)* 
Log Distance: total population 1.41(.07)* 1.40 (.07)* 
Physical distance effects   
Physical distance  (10 Mile units) .73 (.03)* .73(.03)* 
Model Details   
N 1294 1294 
Count R2 .87 .87 
McKelvey and Zavonia R2 .77 .76 
Note:  Cell entries are odds ratio estimates from a logit model with standard errors in paratheses.  
*Reject null hypothesis of odds ratio=1, p<.05.  Correlation between distance percent urban 
population and urban housing equals .99, so the parameter estimates for percent urban housing 
and percent urban population are incorrect in the full model due to near perfect collinearity. 
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Table 4:  Exponential Random Graph Models of Local Government Collaboration Networks 
 Full Model 
Without 
Race and 
Urban 
Population 
Without 
Network 
Effects 
Network effects    
Alternating k-stars -.61(.18)* -.59 (.18)* NA 
Alternating k-triangles 1.19 (.17)* 1.20 (.17)* NA 
Alternating independent 2-paths .05 (.01)* .05(.01)* NA 
Ideological effects    
Distance: voter registration -.01 (.01) -.02(.009)* -.03(.01)* 
Socio-economic effects    
Distance: income ($1000) -.01 (.008) -.02(.009)* -.03 (.01)* 
Distance: percent non-white -.02 (.009)* NA NA 
Square root distance: percent population 
change -.003(.01) -.003(.01) -.008(.01) 
Distance: percent urban population. -.002(.03) NA NA 
Distance: percent urban housing -.004(.03) -.006(.003)* -.008(.004)* 
Log distance: total population .14 (.04)* .13(.04)* .23(.04)* 
Physical distance effects    
Physical distance  (10 mile units) -.14(.04)* -.13(.03)* -.22(.03)* 
 
 
 
